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NEXT STOP CENSORSHIP: A FACIAL
CHALLENGE TO THE METROPOLITAN
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY'S NEWLY
ADOPTED ADVERTISING STANDARDS
INTRODUCTION
The New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (the
"MTA") recently adopted new rules allowing it to control the con-
tent of a wide array of advertisements displayed on its proper-
ties. The new rules permit the MTA to reject certain controver-
sial advertisements upon a determination by an MTA official
that the advertisement falls into one of six broad categories. Be-
fore the new standards were adopted, the MTA's only criteria for
accepting advertisements were that the advertisements not be
obscene or false. Since it commenced selling advertising space,
the MTA has, in fact, displayed numerous political and non-
commercial advertisements.'
This Note examines the constitutionality of the MTA's ad-
vertising standards and concludes that they are facially violative
of the First Amendment.2 Part I details the newly adopted stan-
dards and the procedure by which the MTA intends to imple-
ment them. Part II establishes that the MTA is a state actor and
therefore is required to comport with the First Amendment.
Part III asserts that the MTA advertising standards effectuate a
prior restraint on protected speech and therefore are subject to a
facial constitutional attack. Part IV applies the public forum
1 For example, the MTA has displayed advertisements calling for a boycott of
Citibank because of the company's allegedly unfair treatment of union workers,
public service messages relating to contraception and AIDS, advertisements sup-
porting or opposing political candidates, and advertisements against smoking and
lung cancer.
The First Amendment states, in part: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment
is applicable to the state and local governments through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); Kingsley Intl Pictures
Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 684 (1959); Hughes v. Superior
Court, 339 U.S. 460, 462 (1950).
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doctrine to the MTA's advertising spaces; this section determines
that courts are divided as to the nature of the limited public fo-
rum, especially as applied to advertising spaces managed by gov-
ernment agencies. Part V examines the facial constitutionality
of the standards in the context of both a public and non-public
forum. If a court determines that the advertising spaces on MTA
properties are limited public fora, the standards will be found to
be facially unconstitutional.
I. THE NEW MTA ADVERTISING STANDARDS
A. Content and Context Restrictions
On September 30, 1997, the MTA enacted new advertising
standards giving it substantial discretion over the content of ad-
vertisements it chooses to display.! The old standards prohibited
advertisements that were obscene or false.4 The new standards
were promulgated in response to numerous complaints the MTA
had received about its advertisements.5 The MTA designed six
new categories of advertisements that could be constitutionally
' See Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Board Resolution Adopting
Amendments, Sept. 30, 1997 [hereinafter Board Resolution] (on file with author).
The MTA's former advertising standards were adopted in March 1994. See id.
4 See Andy Newman, New M.T.A. Rules on Ads Anger Civil Libertarians, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 1, 1997, at B3 (stating that a few years ago, agency officials said that
they thought the First Amendment barred them from rejecting any advertisements
unless the ads were "sexually explicit or made false claims"); Niraj Warikoo, MTA
Approves Limits on Ads: Opinions Vary on Scope of The Decision, NEWSDAY, Oct. 1,
1997, at A27 (discussing a statement made by Michael Vaccari, head of the MTA's
legal department, that "previous MTA advertising standards only allowed the ban-
ning of ads that were obscene or misleading").
See Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Legal Dep't Staff Summary, at 1,
Sept. 18, 1997 [hereinafter MTA Staff Summary] (on file with author) (providing
background for legal department's approval of new advertising standards by noting
that "certain ads have provoked strong reactions from public officials, private indi-
viduals and organizations"). In particular, the MTA was barraged with complaints
after it displayed a 1995 Calvin Klein underwear advertisement campaign featuring
underage models in provocative poses. See Editorial, Limiting Speech in Subways,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1997, at A30 (stating that MTA was voting "to modify the
guidelines after Calvin Klein underwear ads on buses generated public complaints");
Newman, supra note 4, at B3 (quoting MTA Chairman, E. Virgil Conway, as saying
that the new guidelines were "aimed at racy fashion ads like a 1995 campaign for
Calvin Klein underwear that appeared to depict under-age models in provocative
poses"). The MTA standards were developed under the guidance of its legal depart-
ment which hired noted constitutional scholar Michael W. McConnell. See MTA
Staff Summary, supra, at 1.
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prohibited.6
The 1997 standards added six new categories of advertise-
ments that may be rejected by the MTA. In addition to being
able to reject obscene or false advertisements, the MTA may now
reject an advertisement that (a) "contains an image of a person,
who appears to be a minor, in sexually suggestive dress, pose, or
context"; (b) is, or contains information in it that is, "directly ad-
verse to the commercial or administrative interests of the MTA
or is harmful to the morale of MTA employees"; (c) "contains im-
ages or information that demean an individual or group of indi-
viduals on account of race, color, religion, national origin, ances-
try, gender, age, disability or sexual orientation"; (d) "contains
images.., that are so violent, frightening, or otherwise disturb-
ing as to be harmful to minors"; (e) "promotes an escort service,
dating service, or sexually oriented business"; or (f) "contains
images or information that would be deemed by a significant
segment of the public to be patently offensive, improper, or in
bad taste."7 The advertising standards do not define any of the
various terms of art used in these regulations.
B. Approval Procedures
Under the new standards, once an advertiser contracts with
the MTA to advertise on its property, the advertiser must submit
the advertisement to the MTA advertising contractor so that the
contractor may determine whether the advertisement falls, or
may fall, within any of the aforementioned categories.8 If the
contractor makes such a finding, they must notify the MTA.9 If
the MTA concurs with its contractor, it has the option of discuss-
ing alternate designs with the advertiser and allowing the ad-
vertiser an opportunity to submit a revised advertisement.'0 The
MTA may reject the advertisement if it finds that the advertise-
ment is unsalvageable under the standards or if the MTA and
the advertiser cannot reach an agreement with regard to proper
6 See id. The MTA Board had approved the standards by a twelve to one vote.
See Newman, supra note 4, at B3.
See Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Proposed Amendments to Adver-
tising Standards [hereinafter MTA Proposed Amendments], § 1(a)(ix) - (xiv) (1997)
(on file with author).
8 See id. § 3(c).
9 See id. § 3(c)(i).
'0 See id. § 3(c)(i)-(v).
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revision of the advertisement." The advertiser can petition the
MTA for a formal determination. 2 Upon the issuance of an MTA
formal determination, the rejection is final."
C. Justifications for the New Standards
The MTA and its legal department offered various justifica-
tions for restricting what is otherwise constitutionally protected
speech. The department concluded that, in general, the MTA's
private commercial interests in maintaining and operating a
transportation system allowed it greater "discretion to impose
reasonable restrictions on ads."' 4 The MTA legal department de-
termined that the MTA was permitted to take into account its
own interests in "maximizing revenues generated by advertis-
ing" 5 and in "promoting and maintaining the orderly admini-
stration and operation of the MTA .... ,,'6 According to the de-
partment's analysis, the MTA's fear that passengers would
associate the MTA with controversial ads appearing on its prop-
erty gave the MTA the right to limit types of advertising set out
in the standards. 7 Furthermore, the legal department concluded
that the advertising standards advanced the MTA's compelling
interest in protecting minors, and captive audience passengers
who would be forced to confront objectionable ads." Finally, the
" See id.
12 See id. The formal determination is made by the MTA Contract Administrator
or his designee. See id. The Contract Administrator may, but is not required to, con-
sult with the advertising contractor, the MTA General Counsel, the Executive Di-
rector, or the Chairman of the Board. See id. § 3(c)(iv). The Administrator must no-
tifv the advertiser of any determination. See id.13 See id.
14 MTA Staff Summary, supra note 5, at 1 (emphasis omitted).
"' Id. In 1996 alone, the MTA generated close to $34 million in revenue from
selling advertising space on MTA properties. See Metropolitan Transportation
Authority Real Estate Advertising Revenue, 1994 -1996 (chart) (on file with author).
Therefore, the MTA's decision to allow or disallow a given advertisement signifi-
cantly affects the advertiser's ability to circulate its message. See Limiting Speech in
Subways, supra note 5, at A30 ("Generating ad revenues is part of the M.T.A.'s job
in serving transit passengers. It can do that without unconstitutionally restricting
ad content or denying its critics a powerful public forum.") (emphasis added).
'a MTA Staff Summary, supra note 5, at 1.
17 See id.
18 See id. at 1-2. Advertisements in New York's MTA reach an enormous seg-
ment of the population. In 1996, approximately 1.6 billion people rode on the various
forms of MTA transportation, including over 1.11 billion subway riders and over
435.9 million New York City bus riders. See Metropolitan Transportation Authority,
New York City Transit, Annual Ridership, 1994-1996 (chart) (on file with author).
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department determined that the new standards advanced the
MTA's compelling interest in protecting itself from the negative
commercial effects of displaying ads that could adversely affect
business and employee morale. 9
II. THE MTA AS A STATE ACTOR
It is well settled that constitutional constraints apply only to
governmental entities and not to the conduct of private parties."
In Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.,21 the Supreme
Court held that where "the Government creates a corporation by
special law, for the furtherance of governmental objectives, and
retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of
the directors of that corporation, the corporation is part of the
Government for purposes of the First Amendment."" The MTA
was created by the New York Metropolitan Transportation
Authority Act' and is specifically designated as a public benefit
corporation.2 The majority of the MTA's board of directors are
Compare with 1996 suburban ridership of 61.6 million Metro-North passengers, see
Metro-North Railroad, Historical Ridership, 1991-1997 (chart) (on file with author),
and 74.4 million Long Island Railroad passengers, see Long Island Railroad, Annual
Ridership, 1994-1996 (chart) (on file with author).
19 See id. at 1.
20 See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S.
557, 566 (1995) (holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guaran-
tee a shield against private conduct); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S.
614, 619 (1991) ("[Clonstitutional guarantees of individual liberty and equal protec-
tion do not apply to the actions of private entities."); San Francisco Arts & Athletics,
Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542 n.22 (1987) (holding that
because the respondent was not a state actor, the Court need not reach the peti-
tioner's Fifth Amendment claims); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (stating
that the "[Fourteenth] Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct,
however discriminatory or wrongful.").
21 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
22 Id. at 400. In Lebron, Amtrak contended that it was a private corporation,
pointing specifically to language in its charter that disclaimed government agency
status. See id. at 392. Justice Scalia, writing for an eight to one majority, stated that
the language in Amtrak's charter was not determinative of whether Amtrak was "an
agency or instrumentality of the United States for the purpose of individual rights
guaranteed against the Government by the Constitution." I& at 394. The majority
reasoned that the government cannot "evade the most solemn obligations imposed
in the Constitution by simply resorting to the corporate form." Id. at 397. Because
Amtrak was created and controlled by the government, the Court concluded that
Amtrak was a state actor amenable to the First Amendment. See id. at 400.
23 N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 1260-1278 (McKinney 1997).
24 See N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1263(1)(a) (McKinney 1997) ("There is hereby cre-
ated the 'metropolitan transportation authority.' The authority shall be a body cor-
porate and politic constituting a public benefit corporation."); id- § 1264(2)
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appointed by various New York State government officials.2
Therefore, under Lebron, the MTA is a state actor.5 Indeed,
courts have repeatedly applied the First Amendment to the MTA
without pausing to consider the state actor issue.27
III. THE MTA STANDARDS CAN BE ATTACKED ON THEIR FACE AS A
CONTENT BASED PRIOR RESTRAINT OF EXPRESSION
By giving MTA officials substantial power to censor adver-
tisements based on their content, the MTA, a state actor, has
created an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech. A
prior restraint gives "'public officials the power to deny use of a
forum in advance of actual expression.' ,,28 The Supreme Court
has consistently held that any "law subjecting the exercise of
First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license,
without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the li-
censing authority, is unconstitutional."29 The MTA is imposing a
(McKinney 1997) ("It is hereby found and declared that [the] purposes [of the MTA
are in all respects for the benefit of the people of the state of New York and the
authority shall be regarded as performing an essential governmental function in
carryr"ng out its purposes and in exercising the powers granted by this title.").
See id. § 1263(1)(a).
The authority shall consist of a chairman, sixteen other voting members,
and two non-voting and four alternate non-voting members... appointed
by the governor by and with the advice and consent of the senate. Four of
the sixteen voting members other than the chairman shall be appointed on
the written recommendation of the mayor of the city of New York; and
each of seven other voting members other than the chairman shall be ap-
pointed after selection from a written list of three recommendations from
the chief executive officer of the county in which the particular member is
required to reside pursuant to the provisions of this subdivision.Id.
26 For the purposes of this Note the terms "state actor" and "government actor"
are used synomously.
27See, e.g., Gannett Satellite Info. Network v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 745
F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the MTA's imposition of licensing fees was an
appropriate time, place and manner restriction on a publisher's First Amendment
right to distribute newspapers at newsstands on MTA property); Hevesi v. Metro-
politan Transp. Auth., 827 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (rejecting plaintiffs mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction that would have forced the MTA to display certain
advertisements); Penthouse Intl Ltd. v. Koch, 599 F. Supp. 1338 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(concluding that MTA advertising space was a designated public forum and that
MTA violated First Amendment by rejecting political advertisement).
28 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 795 n.5 (1989) (quoting South-
eastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975)).
29 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969). In Shut-
tlesworth, the Court held that an ordinance that delegated to the local government
the authority to deny a license to demonstrate if, in its judgment, such demonstra-
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prior restraint on speech because an MTA official has virtually
"unbridled discretion" to deny the use of an advertising forum in
advance of actual expression.30 In determining whether a spe-
tion was contrary to "decency, good order, [or] morals" in effect gave the government
"virtually unbridled and absolute" discretion and was facially unconstitutional. Id.
at 150.
30 Cf Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755 (1988) (holding un-
constitutional an ordinance that gave the mayor discretion in granting permits for
newspaper stands); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,
452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981) (upholding the constitutionality of a Minnesota Agricul-
tural Society rule that limited the sale or distribution of printed material to desig-
nated areas); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56 (1965) (upholding appellant's
challenge of section 2 of the Maryland Motion Picture Censorship Statute as an in-
valid prior restraint); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940); Desert Outdoor
Adver., Inc. v. City of Moreno Valley, 103 F.3d 814, 819 (1996) (finding a town ordi-
nance unconstitutional because it gave "[clity officials... unbridled discretion in
determining whether a particular structure or sign [would] be harmful to the com-
munity's health, welfare, or 'aesthetic quality").
The above cases address whether a particular regulation gives a government
authority "unbridled discretion" to grant or deny expressive activity by conditioning
use of a forum on overbroad, sometimes non-existent, subjective criteria. A "speech"
licensing scheme can also give a government authority "unbridled discretion" by not
providing procedural safeguards to limit the authority's ability to indirectly deny
access to the forum by delaying grant of the license. See, e.g., FWLPBS, Inc. v. City of
Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225-26 (1990) (noting that the failure to place time limits on a
censor's decision and giving a governmental official decisionmaking power without
procedural safeguards constitute two different types of "unbridled discretion" which
are subject to facial attacks as prior restraints); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-62 (1975) (noting that procedural safeguards, such as
prompt judicial review, may avoid a finding of unconstitutionality); Blount v. Rizzi,
400 U.S. 410, 416-17 (1971) (stating that a determination should be made within a
brief period of time to avoid the effect of finality); Carroll v. President & Comn'rs of
Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968) (holding invalid a 10 day restraining order
issued without notice); Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59 (holding that procedural safe-
guards must contain "prompt final judicial decision[s], to minimize the deterrent
effect of an... erroneous denial of a license"); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372
U.S. 58, 70-71 (1963) (mandating 'judcial superintendence and.., an almost im-
mediate judicial determination of the validity of the restraint"). The Court has re-
quired three procedural safeguards to ensure expeditious decisionmaking:
(1) any restraint prior to judicial review can be imposed only for a specified
brief period during which the status quo must be maintained; (2) expedi-
tious judicial review of that decision must be available; and (3) the censor
must bear the burden of going to court to suppress the speech and must
bear the burden of proof once in court.
FWI/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. at 227 (citing Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-60). None of these
requirements are met by the MTA's present system. It would seem, however, that
placing such procedural requirements would make managing the advertising busi-
ness of a state-run commercial enterprise "inconvenient if not unworkable." Lebron,
749 F.2d at 898 n.10 (holding that transit authority's advertising standard was un-
constitutional prior restraint due to overbroadness yet doubting that procedural re-
quirements were workable in a state-run commercial enterprise).
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cific advertisement is, for example, "offensive," the MTA official
is not guided by any objective standards. Rather, approval is
based on an MTA official's subjective interpretation of several
broad categories.3
It is well settled that "reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions are an exception to the general prohibition against
prior restraints."32 Although the MTA advertising standards ar-
guably regulate the "manner" in which advertisers express their
message, they are not valid content-neutral, time, place and
manner restrictions. Courts have defined the term manner nar-
rowly, stating "to be considered a valid manner restriction, a
regulation cannot be aimed at the communicative impact of ex-
pressive conduct."33 The MTA regulations, however, violate these
standards by looking solely to the impact of the advertisements:
the censor tries to predict whether an advertisement will, for ex-
ample, frighten children, offend the public, or harm employee
morale. Furthermore, a requirement is only "content neutral" if
it is "justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech... ."" The MTA regulations are by definition "content-
based," because they specifically mandate that an MTA official
apply the advertising standards to the content of each adver-
tisement, with the goal of controlling the words or images that
3' See Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1230
(7th Cir. 1985) ("We question whether a regulation of speech that has as its touch-
stone a government official's subjective view that the speech is 'controversial' could
ever pass constitutional muster."); cf Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 546 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("A regula-
tion of speech that is motivated by nothing more than a desire to curtail expression
of a particular point of view on controversial issues of general interest is the purest
example of a law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press' ") (alteration
in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).
31 Community For Creative Non-Violence v. Turner, 893 F.2d 1387, 1390 (D.C.
Cir. 1990). To be valid in a public forum, a reasonable time, place, and manner re-
striction must be "content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant govern-
mental interest, and allow for sufficient alternative channels of communication." Id.;
accord Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
"' AIDS Action Comm. of Mass. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1,
8 (1st Cir. 1994) (emphasis added) (citing LAURENCE A. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAw §12-2, at 791-92 (2d ed. 1988)); see also Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 19-26 (1971) (holding that the government may regulate the manner in
which a speaker chooses to convey speech, but not the substance of the speech).
34 Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 US 288, 293 (1984); cf.
City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers For Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (upholding a
viewpoint-neutral regulation which prohibited posting signs on public objects when
government interest was aesthetic value).
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the advertiser might select to convey its message.
The MTA advertising standards can be challenged on their
face as violative of the First Amendment, because they serve to
create a prior restraint on expression. When a government actor
has "substantial power to discriminate based on the content or
viewpoint of speech by suppressing disfavored speech or disliked
speakers," a person subjected to the regulation has standing to
challenge it on its face without having to apply for and be denied
a license to speak.35 A facial challenge enables a party whose
own free speech rights may not be threatened by the government
regulations to challenge "the wording of the statute in order to
protect future victims against the potential for abuse that the
statute creates."36 By carving out an exception to the normal
rules of standing, courts alleviate two identifiable risks to free
expression, first, the risk that the pervasive threat of censorship
will intimidate the speaker into censoring his or her own speech,
and, second, the risk that courts will be unable to effectively de-
tect and review "content-based censorship 'as applied.' "' These
risks clearly exist where an advertiser's ability to communicate
his message is subject to review by an MTA official armed with a
broadly defined list of advertising restrictions.38 Before expend-
3* City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 759 (emphasis added); see also FWIPBS, Inc.,
493 U.S. at 223 ("Although facial challenges to legislation are generally disfavored,
they have been permitted in the First Amendment context where the licensing
scheme vests unbridled discretion in the decisionmaker .... ") (citing City Council of
Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798 & n.15 (1984)); Freedman,
380 U.S. at 56 ("[It is well established that one has standing to challenge a statute
on the ground that it delegates overly broad licensing discretion to an administra-
tive office, whether or not his conduct could be proscribed by a properly drawn stat-
ute, and whether or not he applied for a license.").
36 Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Berger, 894 F.2d 61, 66 (3d Cir.
1990).
3' City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 759.
In order to ensure an optimal level of constitutional enforcement, it is nec-
essary to allow facial challenges to overbroad statutes [affecting speech] ir-
respective of the plaintiffs particular injury. This is so because piece-meal
litigation is an inadequate method of enforcing the Constitution when a
governmental official is given unrestricted authority to regulate speech on
a case-by-case basis.
Gannett Satellite Info. Network, 894 F.2d at 65-66 (noting that ordinary litigation,
which requires standing, cannot effectively police this type of censorship).
38 See generally THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
506 (1970). Emerson noted:
A system of prior restraint is in many ways more inhibiting than a system
of subsequent punishment: It is likely to bring under government scrutiny
a far wider range of expression; it shuts off communication before it takes
1998]
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ing time, energy, and money in developing an advertisement
campaign, advertisers seeking to avoid rejection by the MTA will
engage in self-censorship by choosing to produce ads that are
non-controversial. Furthermore, the MTA may censor a signifi-
cant number of advertisements without any means of detection
by the judiciary. 9
Systems of prior restraint are not per se unconstitutional.4 °
A government actor who seeks to impose a prior restraint, how-
ever, bears a heavy burden to prove its constitutionality.4' The
precise burden of proving the constitutionality of a system of
prior restraint depends on both (a) the type of speech
(commercial or non-commercial) being restricted42 and (b) the na-
place; suppression by a stroke of the pen is more likely to be applied than
suppression through a criminal process; the procedures do not require at-
tention to the safeguards of the criminal process; the system allows less
opportunity for public appraisal and criticism; the dynamics of the system
drive toward excesses, as the history of all censorship shows.
Id.
39 See City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 758 (noting that while courts can quickly
determine whether a licensor acts unconstitutionally, it cannot provide relief where
a speaker censors herself and that many censored individuals or entities are unable
or unwilling to litigate).
40 See Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 558.
41 See id. (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 n.10 (1963));
see also United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 468
(1995) (imposing presumption against constitutional validity); Nebraska Press Ass'n
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1976); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713, 714 (1971) (same).
42 See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64 (1983). It is well set-
tled that commercial speech has been afforded less protection than other constitu-
tionally protected forms of speech. See id.; Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447, 455 (1978). The court has defined "commercial speech" as speech that "relate[s]
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience," Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980), or, elsewhere,
as speech that "[does] no more than propose a commercial transaction." Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).
Commercial speech that is truthful and concerns lawful activity still receives
"substantial" First Amendment protection. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564
(holding that the government must show asserted interest in restricting commercial
speech is substantial, restriction directly advances such interest, and such restric-
tion is no more extensive than necessary to advance that interest). But see Posadas
de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 350 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("I see no reason why commercial speech should be afforded less protec-
tion than other types of speech where, as here, the government seeks to suppress
commercial speech in order to deprive consumers of accurate information concern-
ing lawful activity.").
For purposes of a facial challenge to regulations that limit expression without
differentiating between commercial and non-commercial speech, it is not necessary
to analyze whether the government's interest meets the lower threshold of scrutiny
[Vol. 72:485
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ture of the government property on which the speech is being re-
stricted.
IV. THE MTA ADVERTISING SPACES AS LIMITED PUBLIC FORA: IS
IT POSSIBLE UNDER CURRENT SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE?
Government restriction of expression on government prop-
erty necessitates an inquiry into the "murky status of the public
forum doctrine." 3 Since opening the transit system to advertis-
ers, the MTA indiscriminately has opened its display cases to all
types of commercial and non-commercial advertisements. By
adopting the new advertising standards, however, the MTA has
expressly labeled its advertising spaces as non-public fora for
those advertisements that an MTA censor decides fall within one
of the prohibited categories.44 The MTA asserts the right to re-
define a limited public forum so as to exclude certain advertise-
ments along content-based lines. Although allowing a govern-
ment actor to change a public forum into a non-public forum in
used to assess governmental restrictions on commercial speech. See Gannett Satel-
lite Info. Network, 894 F.2d at 69 (subjecting facial challenge of ordinance reaching
"advertisements," which includes both commercial and non-commercial forms of
speech, to stricter scrutiny given non-commercial speech applicability); cf. Posadas
de Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. at 340 (subjecting facial challenge of prior restraint to
commercial speech scrutiny because restriction involves only pure commercial
speech); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483
U.S. 522, 535 (1987) (analyzing first whether prior restraint reaches non-
commercial speech). By definition, a facial challenge allows a plaintiff to assert the
First Amendment rights of a third party. See Gannett Satellite Info. Network, 894
F.2d at 66 (observing that " 'an individual whose own speech or expressive conduct
may validly be prohibited ... is permitted to challenge a statute on its face because
it also threatens others not before the court. . .' ") (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Ar-
cades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985)). Thus, any purely "commercial" advertiser
could still raise a constitutional challenge to the advertising standards as applied to
non-commercial speech. Furthermore, the mere fact that the MTA regulations cover
"advertising" does not mean that these regulations reach only "commercial speech."
See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964); see also Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) ("The relationship of speech to the marketplace of
products or of services does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas."). The
MTA has had a long history of accepting both commercial and non-commercial ad-
vertisements. As such, the remainder of this Note will consider the advertising
standards as applied to non-commercial speech.
43 AIDS Action Comm. of Mass. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1,
9 (1st Cir. 1994).
" See Board Resolution, supra note 3 ("[The MTA is not a public forum for ad-
vertisements that fall into one or more of the categories set forth in the Advertising
Standards .... "). It is possible to make the argument the MTA, by making this
statement, implicitly recognizes that formerly, all advertising spaces were a desig-
nated public forum.
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this way would seem to frustrate the overall aim of the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court's existing interpretation of the
public forum doctrine upholds the MTA's ability to do so.
The extent to which the MTA may restrict a speaker's right
to communicate its message hinges on the relevant forum to
which the speaker wants access and how that forum is charac-
terized for First Amendment purposes. 5 Classifying the relevant
forum is often determinative of whether or not a government re-
striction on speech survives scrutiny.46 The first step in perform-
ing what has come to be known as "forum analysis" is defining
the relevant forum.47  The relevant forum is determined by
"focus[ing] on the access sought by the speaker.' 8 For purposes
of this Note, the relevant forum will be all advertising space on
MTA properties, including display cases inside and outside of
buses and train cars.49
Generally, government property falls into one of three cate-
gories: (1) the traditional public forum, ° (2) the designated pub-
"' See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983)
(distinguishing the First Amendment protection provided for communications in
teachers' mailboxes and other areas of school speech).
46 See David Garland, Comment, Texas v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. The
Fifth Circuit Applies the Public Forum Doctrine to Adopt-a-Highway Programs, 70
TUL. L. REV. 1195, 1199 (1996) ("[The categorization of the relevant forum is a
critical and an often outcome-determinative issue."); C. Thomas Dienes, The Trash-
ing of the Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 109, 120 (1986) (noting that the court's designation of a forum as non-public
determines its decision).
4 Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Dep't of Aviation, 45 F.3d 1144, 1151 (7th Cir. 1995)
(citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797
(1985)); see also Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. (AMTRAK), 69 F.3d 650,
655 (2d Cir. 1995) (defining relevant forum not as all advertising space in Penn Sta-
tion, but rather as the unique billboard hanging above Penn Station rotunda).
48 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801.
'9 See Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 45 F.3d at 1151-52 (determining that relevant forum
for purposes of an advertiser's challenge of FAA advertising standards was airport
display cases and not the entire airport concourse); see also Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974) (analyzing whether "car card space" for
advertisements in city transportation vehicles was a public forum). Some earlier
cases involving challenges to similar advertising restrictions have not taken the step
to limit the forum to advertising spaces on transit systems and, instead, have con-
sidered the transit system as a whole. See Penthouse Intl v. Koch, 599 F. Supp.
1338, 1346-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Chicago Transit Auth.,
592 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ill. 1984), affd, 767 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1985).
See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45 (noting that traditional public fora in-
clude those places, such as streets and parks, that have traditionally been devoted
to assembly and debate).
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lic forum, whether of a limited or unlimited character, 5' and (3)
the non-public forum.52 The MTA advertising spaces admittedly
do not fall into the traditional public forum category, which in-
cludes parks, streets, or any property that has been historically
devoted to assembly and debate.53 The central issue raised by a
challenge to the MTA advertising standards is whether the MTA
advertising spaces are a designated or limited public forum and,
therefore, whether regulation of expression in those spaces
should be subjected to strict scrutiny.
A designated public forum is property that the government
has opened for expressive activity by all or part of the public.4
"The government does not create a [designated] public forum by
inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by inten-
tionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse."5
Any regulation of speech in a designated public forum is subject
to the highest level of scrutiny.55 A content-based regulation can
only withstand such scrutiny if there is a showing "that [the]
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and
that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."57
A. Forum Designated by Intent of State Actor
1. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc.
The Court in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educa-
51 See id. at 46 n.7 (noting that a "public forum may be created for a limited
purpose such as use by certain groups... or for the discussion of certain subjects")
(citations omitted).
52 See id. at 46.
Id.
See id.; International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S.
672, 678 (1992).
"s Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. The charging of a fee by the government does not
rule out the possibility that the government has designated the forum as public. See
Airline Pilots Ass'n, 45 F.3d at 1155 (7th Cir. 1995).
See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46; Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)
(holding that a content based regulation of speech in a public forum must further a
icompelling governmental interest).
See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. Government restrictions of expression in a non-
public forum, however, need only be reasonable but still may not discriminate on the
basis of viewpoint See id. at 49; United States Postal Service v. Council of Green-
burgh Civic Ass'ns., 453 U.S. 114, 131 n.7 (1981) (stating that in areas of nonpublic
fora, the state may not suppress speech because of opposition to the speaker's view-
point).
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tional Fund, Inc.58 examined the government's intent to establish
and maintain a particular property to determine whether the
government property has become a designated forum. 9 In
Cornelius, the Court looked at three factors to determine
whether the government "intended" to open the relevant forum,
a charity drive in the federal workplace, as a "public forum":"0 (1)
whether the government's "policy and practice" in opening and
operating the relevant forum suggested an intent to promote free
expression;' (2) whether the government's motivation for open-
ing the forum was a desire to create an open forum for expres-
sion or to accomplish purposes unrelated to expression;2 and (3)
whether the nature of the government property invoked govern-
ment's role as proprietor or its role as law-maker." In conclud-
ing that the charity drive was a non-public forum, Justice
O'Connor observed that (1) the government had never expressly
designated the charity drive as open to the public and had a
clear policy aimed at limiting entrants to the forum; (2) when
initiating the charity drive program, the government was not
motivated by a desire to provide an open forum for charity solici-
473 U.S. 788 (1985).
r9 See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
"The procedure with which the Court determined whether the federal govern-
ment intended to open the Combined Federal Campaign, an annual charity drive
conducted in the federal workplace, as a public forum, is not entirely clear. The
opinion begins the analysis by setting forth a two-part test: (1) what has been the
"policy and practice" of the government, and (2) whether the nature of the property
and its compatibility with expressive activity have any bearing on the government's
intent. Id. at 802. Thus, where government opens a municipal auditorium, clearly
the forum was "designed for and dedicated to expressive activities." Id. at 803 (citing
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975)). The Court went
on to observe, however, that in cases where the government has demonstrated a
policy of limiting certain types of expression, the government has not demonstrated
the requisite intent to create a public forum. See id. at 802-03. As support for this,
the Court cited Perry Educ. Ass'n, which held that a school principal, by restricting
access to school mailboxes, prevented the mailboxes from becoming a public forum.
See id. at 803. Similarly, in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, the Court noted that
for twenty-six years the local transit authority had prevented political advertising
and thereby prevented the advertising spaces from becoming public fora. See id. at803.8. Id. at 802.
"See id. at 805 (noting that courts examine whether the property is compatible
with expressive activity to determine the government's intent).
"See id. at 806. Earlier in the opinion, Justice O'Connor, citing the Lehman
opinion, noted that the Court was particularly reluctant to hold that the govern-
ment intended to designate a public forum where expressive activity might disrupt
the principal function of the property. See id. at 804.
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tations but rather to control workplace interference caused by
unregulated solicitations by charities; and (3) the government
property involved, the federal workplace, existed to accomplish
the business of the employer and, as such, the govern-
ment/employer has the discretion to control speaker access so as
not to frustrate the forum's principal purpose."
2. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee
The Court substantially narrowed the Cornelius definition of
a designated forum in International Society for Krishna Con-
sciousness, Inc. v. Lee.' The plaintiffs in Krishna Consciousness
challenged an airport regulation banning distribution of flyers
and the solicitation of funds in the airport terminal." Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, determined that the
airports were non-public fora.67 He began his analysis by observ-
ing that "[wihere the government is acting as a proprietor, man-
aging its internal operations, rather than acting as lawmaker
with the power to regulate or license, its action will not be sub-
jected to the heightened review to which its actions as a law-
maker may be subject."6 The Court next determined that air-
port terminals are non-public fora because airport operators,
who had brought "frequent and continuing litigation" to chal-
lenge speech activity, evidently did not intend that such fora be
opened for such speech activity.69 Finally, the Court emphasized
that "[a]s commercial enterprises, airports must provide services
attractive to the marketplace. In light of this, it cannot fairly be
said that an airport terminal has as a principal purpose promot-
ing 'the free exchange of ideas.' 7o Under Krishna Conscious-
6 See id. at 805-06.
505 U.S. 672 (1992).
66 See Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 675-76. The plaintiffs asserted that it
was their First Amendment right to perform the ritual of Sankirtun, which involved
the dissemination of religious literature and the solicitation of funds to support
their organization. See id.
67 See id. at 679.
Id. at 678 (citing United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990)).
In Kokinda, the Supreme Court held that a sidewalk leading up to the door of a post
office was a non-public forum, thereby allowing the post office to deny access to a
political lobby soliciting contributions on the sidewalk. See 497 U.S. at 736-37. The
Court gave considerable weight to the fact that post offices are examples of the gov-
ernment functioning in its proprietary capacity. See idi at 725.
69 Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 680-81.
70 Id. at 682 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800).
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ness, a government actor does not intend to designate a public
forum if (1) the government is acting in its role as proprietor, or
commercial entrepreneur, and (2) the government has, in some
way, articulated an intent to limit expression in that forum.71
The Court's distinction between government in its role as
proprietor and as lawmaker substantially narrows the desig-
nated public forum doctrine by mandating that when the gov-
ernment is somehow involved in the operation of a "commercial"
enterprise, it does not intend to designate a "public" forum.
Rather, the Court suggests that the government intends to
maximize profits and maintain the efficient use of the property.72
Thus, since Krishna Consciousness, government "property" that
somehow involved the government as commercial participant has
been repeatedly classified as a non-public forum.73 The govern-
ment qua proprietor can reasonably create content-based limita-
tions on expression provided it does not engage in viewpoint dis-
crimination.74
Furthermore, under the Krishna Consciousness test for de-
termining the government's intent, a state actor has free reign
both to designate a forum as "public" and implement a policy by
which it has broad discretion to place content-based limitations
on expression that can be communicated in that public forum.75
71 See id. at 678-82.
72 See, e.g., Gannett Satellite Info. Network, 745 F.2d at 772 (delineating the
MTA's argument that the purpose of its facilities is to maximize revenues).
7See, e.g., Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 69 F.3d 650, 657 (2d Cir. 1995)
(holding it "especially significant" that AMTRAK acted as proprietor, and not as
law-maker, in concluding that AMTRAK had not designated advertising space as
public forum); Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp.
Auth., 937 F. Supp. 425, 430-31 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (citing Lehman and Krishna Con-
sciousness in holding that SEPTA, acting in its proprietary function as owner of the
transit system, intended to properly manage a commercial venture and not open a
forum for expressive activity); cf. Texas v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 58 F.3d
1075, 1078 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the relevant forum was not the shoulder of
highways (where the KKK wanted to engage in expressive activity), but rather the
Texas Adopt-A-Highway Program, and since that program's purpose was to clean up
highways rather than to promote free speech, the court labeled the program a non-
public forum).
74 See Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(positing that regulation of subject matter jurisdiction would be a reasonable limi-
tation, while regulations based on a particular viewpoint would not).
7r This analysis may be illustrated by the following hypothetical: The state
opens an auditorium that can be used by anyone for any lawful purpose. Clearly,
this is a designated public forum. The state allows the auditorium to operate with-
out state interference for a number of years. After a lecturer gives a speech champi-
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First Amendment legal scholars observe that the public forum
doctrine's distinction between the designated public forum and
the non-public forum has become obsolete."6 Citing Cornelius
and Krishna Consciousness, these scholars assert that if the gov-
ernment can constantly redefine the scope of a designated public
forum along content-based lines, it has unilateral authority to
restrict access to what was once a public forum on the basis of
content and can thus avoid the burden of meeting the strict
oning communism, the regulating government authority receives a number of com-
plaints from the community. The authority subsequently adopts a regulation that
gives it discretion to deny access to speakers on controversial matters or, as is the
case with the MTA standards, speeches on matters in bad taste. Under Cornelius,
the government has shown an intent to withdraw public forum status for all
"controversial" speech and may limit its expression without such limitation being
subjected to strict scrutiny. It has always been axiomatic in First Amendment juris-
prudence that "[slelective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on con-
tent alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone." Police Dep't of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972); see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828-29
(explaining speech regulation based on opinion or viewpoint is a constitutional vio-
lation and an impermissible content-based regulation). It is submitted that allowing
the government to limit a public forum in this way would permit content-based ex-
clusions in an otherwise public forum.
76 See, e.g., Marie A. Failinger, New Wine, New Bottles: Private Property Meta-
phors and Public Forum Speech, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 217, 251-52 (1997) (arguing
that current definition of designated public forum treats government property own-
ers as private owners who have carte blanche authority to exclude speakers whose
views they find objectionable); David Goldberger, A Reconsideration of Cox v. New
Hampshire: Can Demonstrators be Required to Pay the Costs of Using America's
Public Forums?, 62 TEX. L. REV. 403, 423-24 (1983) (questioning the validity of the
distinction between designated and non-public fora); Rosemary C. Salomone, Public
Forum Doctrine and the Perils of Categorical Thinking: Lessons From Lamb's
Chapel, 24 N.M. L. REV. 1, 15 (1994) (stating that the government can ostensibly
define designated public fora in terms of speakers or topics, thereby excluding views
that the government finds objectionable); Stephen K. Schutte, International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee: The Public Forum Doctrine Falls to a Government
Intent Standard, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 563, 579-80 (1993) (determining that
under designated public forum category, government is allowed to grant access to
certain expressive activities and still preserve non-forum status with regard to oth-
ers); Garland, supra note 46, at 1204 (asserting that to define a designated forum
according to government's intent "effectively allows the judiciary to rubber stamp
speech-restrictive decisions by government officials"); Lee Rudy, Note, A Procedural
Approach to Limited Public Forum Cases, 22 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 1255, 1279-87
(1995) (noting that the Court's recent approach to limited forum cases has made fo-
rum analysis an "all or nothing" proposition for the designated public forum); R. Al-
exander Acosta, Recent Development, Revealing the Inadequacy of the Public Forum
Doctrine: International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 1125 S. Ct.
2701 (1992), 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 269, 275 (1993) (concluding that Krishna
Consciousness "stripped [the designated forum category] of any heightened First
Amendment protection").
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scrutiny standard.77 The reasoning set forth in Krishna Con-
sciousness, taken to its logical extreme, grants government ac-
tors unchecked powers to avoid strict scrutiny review of restric-
tions on expression in non-traditional fora because every time it
articulates a desire to restrict speech the government actor
evinces an intent to treat the forum as a non-public forum.
3. MTA Advertising Standards Under Intent-Based Forum
Designation
Under the Krishna Consciousness analysis, MTA advertising
spaces would be considered a non-public forum. The MTA has
always sold advertisements not to promote the free exchange of
ideas, but rather to gain revenue. In so doing, the government
actor is engaging in commerce. Controversial ads displayed in
MTA advertising spaces have the potential to interfere with the
MTA's successfully managed business.7" In response, the MTA
has enacted a regime of censorship that evinces a clear intent to
limit expression.79 For example, it is clear that the MTA no
longer wishes to keep its designated public forum open for ad-
vertisements that are critical of the MTA. Under Krishna Con-
sciousness, such considerations are determinative of the MTA's
intent to manage the advertising space as a non-public forum.
Any subsequent litigation challenging the constitutionality of
MTA censorship of ads that fall within the new delineated cate-
gories would, therefore, be subject to the lower level of scrutiny
applicable to non-public fora.
77 See, e.g., Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 699-700 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that an airport terminal is a public forum that cannot be subse-
quently closed off to expressive activities unless the government physically alters
the property or changes its principal use prior to the imposition of restrictions);
Christopher M. Kelly, Note, "The Spectre of a 'Wired Nation"': Denver Area Educa-
tional Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC and First Amendment Analysis in
Cyberspace, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 559, 574 (1997) (expressing concern for the gov-
ernment's ability to deny access to speech through the placement of content-based
regulations).
78 The MTA's constitutional expert hired to design the advertising standards
justifies the use of the standards by pointing to the recent trends in First Amend-
ment jurisprudence that grant government actors participating in commerce signifi-
cant discretion in limiting expression. See MTA Staff Summary, supra note 5, at 1.
7" The MTA Board unequivocally stated its intent not to create a public forum.
See Board Resolution, supra note 3.
[Vol. 72:485
NEXT STOP CENSORSHIP
B. Forum Designated by Practice and Policy of State Actor and
Nature of Forum
Prior to Cornelius and Krishna Consciousness, many lower
courts determined that transit authority advertising spaces were
designated public fora when the transit authority had previously
accepted both commercial and non-commercial advertisements.0
Even after Krishna Consciousness, some circuit and lower courts
have adhered to this system of fora classification, echoing the
concern of legal scholars and dissenting members of the Court.8'
These lower court decisions limit government actors' ability to
"undesignate" what has been designated a public forum and at
the same time make no mention of the proprietor/law-maker
distinction that was at the center of Justice Rehnquist's forum
analysis.82
1. Air Line Pilots Association v. Department of Aviation of
Chicago
In Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Department of Aviation of Chi-
cago,' the Seventh Circuit concluded that advertising displays in
a Chicago airport were designated public fora, reasoning that as-
certaining the government's intent is "not merely a matter of
80 See Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1232
(7th Cir. 1985) (holding that the CTA was a public forum because it had not demon-
strated a "system of control over the advertisements it accepts"); Lebron v. Wash-
ington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 749 F.2d 893, 896 (D.C Cir. 1984) ("[Nlor is there
a question that WMATA has converted its subway stations into public fora by ac-
cepting other political advertising."); Penthouse Intl, Ltd. v. Koch, 599 F. Supp
1338, 1347 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that the NYCTA violated the First Amendment
by removing a poster advertisement depicting the caricature of Walter Mondale
when it had previously designated the subway system as a public forum by display-
ing political advertisements); Coalition for Abortion Rights & Against Sterilization
Abuse v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 584 F. Supp. 985, 989 (W.D.N.Y. 1984)
(finding that the NFTMS had created a public forum by allowing other forms of pro-
tected speech); Gay Activists Alliance of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. Washington
Metro. Area Transit Auth., 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1404 (D.D.C. 1979) (explaining
that the transit authority's past acceptance of social and political communications
designated the interior of buses public fora and, as such, advertisements for gay
rights could not be banned).
81 See Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Dep't of Aviation Chicago, 45 F.3d 1144 (7th Cir.
1995).
' See, e.g., id. at 1153.
45 F.3d 1144 (1995).
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deference to [the government's] stated purpose."' The court, in a
narrow reading of Cornelius, defined the government actor's in-
tent by employing a two-factor analysis aimed at determining:
(1) the government's consistent "policy and practice... with re-
spect to the underlying property," and (2) the nature of the un-
derlying property and whether it is incompatible with the ex-
pressive activity at issue." Furthermore, the court gave a
narrow reading to Justice Rehnquist's proprietary function
analysis, stating that although proprietary status is a "relevant
factor," it is "not dispositive."86
The Air Line Pilots analysis demands that courts first in-
quire whether the government actor has previously maintained a
" 'system of control' " over the advertisements it accepts." By
looking objectively at the actual past practice of the government
actor, the Seventh Circuit guarded against "post-hoc policy for-
mulation or the discretionary enforcement of an effectively inop-
erative policy."' The court cited with approval Planned Parent-
hood Ass'n v. Chicago Transit Authority, 9 the Seventh Circuit's
decision which held that advertising spaces in city buses were
designated public fora because the "CTA maintains no system of
control over the advertisements it accepts for posting on its sys-
tem.... " 0  In applying the second factor, the Air Line Pilots
' Id. at 1152. The court further stated "the government's stated policy, without
more, is not dispositive with respect to the government's intent in a given forum."
Id. at 1153; see also Planned Parenthood, 767 F.2d at 1232 (rejecting CTA's asser-
tion that it did not intend to make advertising space a designated public forum).
Air Line Pilots, 45 F.3d at 1152 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense
Fund & Educ. Fund Int'l, 472 U.S. 788, 802-03 (1985)).
In Air Lines Pilots, the city of Chicago argued that, in light of the recent Su-
preme Court decisions, the test to determine whether the airport advertising space
was a public forum should ask "1) whether the government requires permission to
speak; 2) whether the government has contracted with a third party; 3) whether the
message is inconsistent with the commercial enterprise; and 4) whether the gov-
ernment is acting as a proprietor." Id. at 1152 n.2. The court suggested these factors
might be relevant, but Cornelius did not "mandate" their consideration. Id.
Id. at 1158.
"7 Id. at 1153 (finding that the CTA's "lalssez faire policy'" of offering advertis-
ing space to any advertiser willing to pay a fee supported the holding that advertis-
ing space inside of buses was designated public forum) (quoting Planned Parent-
hood, 767 F.2d at 1232).
88 Id. The court continued to explain that "Itihe government may not create a
policy to implement its newly-discovered desire to suppress a particular message."
Id. (citing Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 117-18 (5th Cir. 1992)).
89 767 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1985).
' Id. at 1232.
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analysis demands an examination of the overall physical nature
of the forum, including but not limited to, the obtrusiveness of
the expressive activity and whether the regulated expression
frustrates the functioning of the forum.9' If free expression is
compatible with the operation of the government property, no in-
ference can be drawn in the absence of a consistent policy and
practice restricting speech on the property that the government
did not intend to open up its forum as a public forum.'
2. MTA Advertising Standards Under Policy, Practice and
Nature Forum Designation
Under the Air Line Pilots analysis, a court would determine
that the MTA's advertising space was opened as a designated
public forum. Local courts, in pre-Krishna Consciousness deci-
sions, already addressed the first Air Line Pilots factor and de-
termined that the MTA had "actively solicited the advertising
public by promoting the subway system as an advertising me-
dium, and ha[d] accepted a variety of commercial and political
messages for display to its riders."93 The fact that the MTA has a
policy of accepting political advertisements is determinative of
the MTA's intent to establish a designated public forum. Simi-
larly, with regard to the second Air Line Pilots factor, a district
court in New York has already observed that MTA's own
"literature proclaims that the 'high average frequency of expo-
sure because of the necessity of regular riding,' combined with
the substantial waiting time and lack of other colorful distrac-
tions for thousands of daily commuters, make the [transit] sys-
tem a 'veritable "Niagara Falls" of buying power.' "" The MTA,
itself, labels its advertising space as ideal for communicating to
the public. The court concluded that "[the MTA] is an appropri-
ate site for passive expressive activity."" Courts could therefore
91 Air Line Pilots, 45 F.3d at 1156.
92 See id.
93 Penthouse Intl, Ltd. v. Koch, 599 F. Supp. 1338, 1346-47 & n.13 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (finding that the New York City Transit Authority, and by association, the
MTA, had specifically created advertising spaces throughout the system, reserved
their use for any advertisers willing to pay the fee, and has accepted "a variety of
commercial and political messages"). But see Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v.
Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 745 F.2d 767, 773 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that public
areas of the MTA are non-public fora) (citing U.S. Southwest Africa/Namibia Trade
& Cultural Council v. United States, 708 F.2d 760, 764-66 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
9 Penthouse Int'l, 599 F. Supp at 1346 (citations omitted).
95 Id.
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conclude that these advertising spaces are designated public
fora.
C. Forum Designated by Waiver of State Actor
1. Yeo v. Lexington
In Yeo v. Lexington,96 prior to withdrawing its opinion on
other grounds,97 the First Circuit reached a similar conclusion,
stating that it was unable to "accept the proposition that gov-
ernment can selectively, and with sole and absolute discretion,
open its facilities or avenues of communication along purely con-
tent-based lines, and thus determine to admit the messages it
likes and choose to exclude the messages it dislikes on no basis
beyond the messages' content."98 In Yeo, the plaintiff's adver-
tisement was rejected by school publications that had a history
of accepting advertisements on a wide range of commercial and
non-commercial subjects.99 The state actors claimed that the
publications had policies subjecting all advertisements to the ap-
proval of the editorial board and that the publications did not ac-
cept "political" or "advocacy" advertisements."° The court explic-
itly rejected the government's argument that state actor's can
create a non-public forum and escape strict scrutiny by merely
reserving broad discretion to censor expression.!0 ' Such an appli-
cation of the public forum doctrine would render it a "circular
nullity."0 2  The court ultimately held that in determining
No. 96-1623, 1997 WL 292173 (1st Cir. June 6, 1997), withdrawn, 131 F.3d
241 (1st Cir. 1997) (en banc). This Note does not present the original Yeo opinion as
a basis for precedential value, but rather as a potential example of an approach to
public forum doctrine.
97 The First Circuit withdrew its opinion after rehearing Yeo en banc. See Yeo,
131 F.3d at 241. The full court affirmed the district court's denial of relief to the
plaintiff, holding that there was no state action and, therefore, no first amendment
violation. See id. Thus, the court did not withdraw its opinion based on its determi-
nation of whether or not the school newspaper was a public forum. Chief Judge
Toruella did, however, author a concurring opinion in which she departed from the
original Yeo opinion and argued that the school newspaper was not a public forum.
See id. (Toruella, C.J., concurring). In any event, the court's withdrawal of its origi-
nal opinion renders its public forum discussion a nullity for precedential purposes.9 Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *11.
9 Id. Plaintiff sought to print advertisements promoting abstinence as a method
for birth control. See id. at *1.
'0 Id. at *10.
'01 See id. at *11.
102 Id.
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whether a government intended to create a designated public fo-
rum, a court must examine "whether [the] government opened
up the forum... indiscriminately to the public, thereby mani-
festing its intent to create a limited public forum, or reserved
that forum for a specific, lawful purpose and excluded expression
incompatible with that purpose, thereby manifesting an intent to
create a nonpublic forum."0 3
By focusing on the government's intent in creating, or
"opening" the forum, the Yeo court foreclosed government offi-
cials from subsequently qualifying that forum's policy of free
speech by anything more than clear, content-neutral, rational
standards.
2. MTA Advertising Standards Under the Yeo Rationale
The Yeo rationale lends support to the assertion that MTA
advertising spaces are designated public fora. The MTA, by
"indiscriminately" accepting advertisements, has designated its
advertising spaces as public fora and now has subsequently
adopted a policy allowing it broad discretion to re-define the
scope of the fora using a post-hoc, content-based analysis. MTA
is attempting to accomplish precisely what the Yeo court could
not accept, the redefinition of a designated public forum along
content-based lines.
Several other lower court decisions suggest that the courts
are unwilling to define public fora by the broad governmental in-
tent standard set forth in Krishna Consciousness." In the end,
it is not certain which way courts will rule in determining
whether the MTA advertising spaces are designated public fora
or non-public fora. The MTA advertisements will give courts an
opportunity to revisit the "murky" public forum doctrine. Strict
application of the recent Supreme Court decisions would yield
the result that the advertising spaces are non-public fora. Fun-
10 Id. at *13 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d
817, 844 (9th Cir. 1991) (Norris, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
104 See, e.g., Marilyn Manson, Inc. v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 971
F. Supp. 875, 884 (D.N.J. 1997) (holding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on
merits in showing that New Jersey Giants Stadium had become a designated public
forum "as a venue for artistic performances"); Hevesi v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth.,
827 F. Supp. 1069, 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that plaintiffs were likely to suc-
ceed in demonstrating that MTA made advertising spaces in buses "designated pub-
lic fora" by "actively promot[ing] the bus system as an advertising medium, and...
display[ing] a wide variety of commercial and political messages as advertising").
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damental constitutional logic and several circuit court opinions,
however, cast considerable doubt on the wisdom of allowing a
government official to "undesignate" a designated public forum
along content-based lines, and subjecting the government to
lower First Amendment standards when it acts as a proprietor
rather than a law-maker.
V. STRICT SCRUTINY AND THE MTA ADVERTISING STANDARDS
In ruling upon a facial challenge to the system of prior re-
strair~t embodied in the MTA advertising standards, a court will
necessarily subject the regulations to one of two levels of scru-
tiny depending on its interpretation of the public forum doc-
trine.05 As noted above, often the court's determination of the
type of forum involved is determinative of the regulation's sur-
vival. 10 6 A content-based prior restraint of pure, non-commercial
speech in a public forum is almost per se unconstitutional. 7 At
the very least, content-based regulations of pure speech are sub-
jected to the "closest scrutiny;",0 8 they must serve a "compelling
state interest" and be "narrowly drawn" to effectuate that inter-
est.10 9 If, however, the court concludes that MTA advertising
spaces are a non-public forum, the system of prior restraint need
only satisfy a lower threshold by being reasonable in light of the
105 See United States v. McDermott, 822 F. Supp. 582, 594 (N.D. Iowa 1993)
(discussing the relationship between the level of scrutiny and the type of regulation
as determined under the public forum doctrine).
1'0 See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. New Jersey Sports
& Exposition Auth., 691 F.2d 155, 159-60 (3d Cir. 1982) ("Although the 'analytical
line' between public and nonpublic forums 'may blur at the edges,' the distinction is
a critical one.") (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453
U.S. 114, 132 (1981)).
107 See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 229 (1990) (concluding that because
ordinance didn't contain procedural safeguards guiding licensor's discretion, certain
provisions of the statute were facially unconstitutional) ; City of Lakewood v. Plain
Dealer Publ'g Co., 485 U.S. 750 (1948) (concluding that an ordinance was facially
unconstitutional because it lacked any limitation on a government official's discre-
tion); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (finding a city ordinance imposing a
prior restraint on the use of sound equipment for the amplification of religious
speech in a public forum to be unconstitutionally void on its face).
'o8 In re National Serv. Corp., 742 F.2d 859, 862 (5th Cir. 1984); accord United
States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726-27 (1990) (applying strict scrutiny to speech in
a public forum); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (stating that the "most ex-
act n scrutiny" must be applied to regulations on speech in public fora).
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); accord
Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987); Bellsouth Corp.
v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D. Ala. 1994).
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purpose served by the forum and viewpoint-neutral.110
A. The Public Forum Analysis
None of the advertising standards are "narrowly drawn" to
protect a "compelling state interest." Such compelling interests
have only been found to exist "in exceptional cases,""' such as
where the prior restraint was necessary to protect national se-
curity,"' to ban fighting words,"' or, in limited circumstances, to
prohibit obscenity."4 In addition, for a content-based statute to
be "narrowly drawn," the statute must be the least "restrictive
alternative" available."' Thus, to the extent that these advertis-
110 See Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. at 131 n.7; Perry, 400 U.S. at 46;
Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse School, 98 F.3d 1530, 1540 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Ha-
zelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988)), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
1335 (1997).
... Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (holding unconstitutional a state
statute which restricted the liberty of the press); see JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.17 (5th ed. 1995).
112 See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) ("It is 'obvious and unargu-
able' that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Na-
tion.") (citations omitted); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980)
(imposing a constructive trust on the proceeds of a publication by a former CIA
agent); New York Times, 403 U.S. at 726 -727 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 730
(Stewart, J., concurring); Jonathan C. Medow, The First Amendment and the Se-
crecy State: Snepp v. United States, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 775, 793-96 (1982)
(discussing the national security exception to the assumption against prior re-
straints).
' See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (affirming a
conviction under a state law that prohibited the use of offensive speech addressed to
another person in a public place). See generally Mark C. Rutzick, Offensive Lan-
guage and the Evolution of First Amendment Protection, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1
(1974) (discussing the fighting words doctrine).
14 See Kingsley v. Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 437 (1957) (allowing gov-
ernment actor a " 'mited injunctive remedy'" against sale of written and printed
materials which were found to be obscene at trial); see also Times Film Corp. v. City
of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 47-48 (1961) (upholding as facially valid Chicago ordinance
requiring all films to be submitted to city official for viewing as prerequisite for li-
cense to show movie where ordinance's purpose was to suppress obscenity).
Such restraints have been permitted on the theory that the censored expression
does not enjoy First Amendment protection. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 485 (1957). Restrictions aimed at unprotected speech must be narrowly tailored
to avoid chilling communication that comes under the protection of the First
Amendment. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56 (1965) (invalidating a
state statute that required state approval prior to the release of any motion pic-
ture).
15 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989); accord Sable
Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)
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ing standards reach proscribable speech, they cannot, however,
be found to be "narrowly tailored" because they also reach speech
that has consistently been protected under the First Amend-
ment.116 Indeed, it would be impossible to conclude that a regu-
lation based on undefined standards, such as "sexually sugges-
tive," "frightening," "harmful," "offensive," or "bad taste," is
"narrowly drawn" or the "least restrictive means" to achieve any
interest. Courts have been adamant about not tolerating sys-
tems of prior restraint over non-commercial speech in public
fora." 7 It has been routinely recognized that content-based re-
strictions on speech predicated on "predicted adverse reactions"
are not compelling state interests justifying restraint of speech."'
Therefore, upon a finding that the advertising spaces are a lim-
ited public forum, the entire set of standards will likely be held
to be facially unconstitutional as content-based prior restraints
on protected free speech.
For the most part, the MTA asserts its commercial interest
in effectively operating a transit system as its compelling inter-
"6 For example, the MTA's interest in prohibiting speech that is "offensive, im-
proper, or in bad taste" is patently unconstitutional in a public forum. MTA Pro-
posed Amendments, supra note 7, § 1(a)(xiv) Offensiveness is "classically not [a]
justification[ I validating the suppression of expression protected by the First
Amendment." Carey v. Population Servs. Intl, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977).
117 See Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., Inc., 445 U.S. 308, 316 n.13 (1980)
(per curiam) (holding a Texas statute unconstitutional, which authorized a prior re-
straint on movies for an indefinite time prior to a determination of whether the
movies were obscene). In Vance, the Court noted:
"Any system of prior restraint, however, 'comes to this Court bearing a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.' The presumption
against prior restraints is heavier-and the degree of protection broader-
than that against limits on expression imposed by criminal penalties. Be-
hind the distinction is a theory deeply etched in our law: a free society pre-
fers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law
than to throttle them and all others beforehand. It is always difficult to
know in advance what an individual will say, and the line between legiti-
mate and illegitimate speech is often so finely drawn that the risks of
freewheeling censorship are formidable."
Id. (citations omitted); see also Penthouse Int'l Ltd. v. Koch, 599 F. Supp. 1338, 1351
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that contract language allowing MTA official to prohibit "
'offensive'" or" 'unsatisfactory'" advertisements without clear and objective criteria
ran risk of arbitrary censorship, an idea particularly repugnant to free speech ide-
als). See generally Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 50-53 (Warren,
C.J., dissenting) (providing an extensive history of judicial hostility toward regula-
tions that exert a prior restraint over protected pure speech).
"8 Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Chicago Transit Authority, 592 F. Supp. at 554,
affd, 767 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1985).
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est in promulgating the advertising standards."9 The govern-
ment asserts that this prohibition furthers its commercial inter-
est in avoiding negative advertising that would decrease em-
ployee morale and hurt business.2 Such an interest has never
been found to be a "compelling" governmental interest justifying
prior restraint of protected speech in a public forum." Fur-
thermore, these standards, which allow an MTA official broad
discretion to reject advertisements, are not narrowly drawn to
protect the government's commercial interests. In a system that
vests a single official with such discretion, it is highly possible
that the censor will reject advertisements that would have been
in no way harmful to the revenue interests of the MTA.
The MTA standards prohibiting advertisements that are
demeaning to particular groups, racial and others, or are
"patently offensive, improper or in bad taste," were adopted to
further the MTA's interest in protecting a captive audience.
The captive audience theory does not hold up to a facial attack.
In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights," the Supreme Court de-
cided to designate advertising spaces inside city buses as non-
public forum, in part, due to the fact that the city had the right
to protect captive audience members on the bus.' A year later,
119 See MTA Staff Summary, supra note 5.
120 See id.
121 See, e.g., U.S. Southwest Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v. United
States, 708 F.2d 760 (D.C. Cir. 1983). In U.S. Southwest, the D.C. Circuit Court as-
sessed whether an airport's commercial interest in advertising revenue amounted to
a "compelling" interest justifying a ban on political advertisements. See id. The
court held that there was no factual showing that revenue returns would be ad-
versely affected by political advertisements so as to create a "compelling" interest.
See id. at 771.
It should be noted, however, that a court which accepts the government's com-
mercial interest justification for restricting speech will likely conclude that the fo-
rum is non-public. See, e.g. Christ's Bride Ministries v. Southeastern Pennsylvania
Trans. Auth., 937 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that subway and commuter
rail stations are non-public fora).
1"2 See MTA Staff Summary, supra note 5, at 2 (quoting MTA Proposed Amend-
ments, supra note 7, § 1(a)(xiv)).
"2 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
124 See id. at 302. But see Penthouse, 599 F. Supp. at 1347 n.14 (holding that
Lehman's conclusion that advertising spaces on city buses was non-public forum was
divorced from "captive audience" rationale). Several courts have addressed the cap-
tive audience theory under analogous and comparable circumstances with mixed
results. Compare Christ's Bride Ministries, 937 F. Supp. at 431 (finding that pas-
sengers in rail and subway stations were a captive audience), and International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 691
F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1982) (applying the captive audience theory to uphold a ban on so-
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however, in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville," the Court held
that a "captive audience" exists only when a medium of expres-
sion is " 'so obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling
individual to avoid exposure to it.' "26 Advertisements displayed
throughout MTA properties involve passive expressive activity
that any sensitive individual can avoid by simply averting his or
her eyes. Furthermore, the fora at issue in Lehman were ar-
guably located inside a city bus. The new MTA standards reach
all advertisements, including those displayed outside trains and
buses. Again, for purposes of a facial challenge, a plaintiff can
show that the regulations are unconstitutional as applied to ad-
vertisements displayed outside of trains or buses. Certainly a
person walking on a street is not a captive audience to adver-
tisements displayed on the outside of buses.
The first advertising standard prohibits advertisements that
"contain[ I] an image of a person, who appears to be a minor, in
sexually suggestive dress, pose or context."' 7 The fourth stan-
dard prohibits advertisements that are "so violent, frightening,
or otherwise disturbing as to be harmful to minors."" The
MTA's asserted interest in protecting children will not justify the
content-based system of prior restraint embodied in these stan-
dards. Protecting children has, in limited circumstances, been
held to be a compelling governmental interest. 9 The Supreme
Court has only found this interest to exist in the context of the
"uniquely pervasive" medium of radio and television broadcast, 130
and, in limited instances, where a statute aims at child pornog-
licitation in a sports complex), with Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980) (rejecting the captive
audience argument in the context of billing inserts), and Planned Parenthood Ass'n
v. Chicago Trans. Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1233 n.11 (7th Cir. 1985) (rejecting the cap-
tive audience argument where the regulation, as applied, censored only one topic).
'2 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
126 Id. at 212 (quoting Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967)); see also
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Chicago Transit Auth., 592 F. Supp. 544, 555 (N.D. Ill.
1984), affd, 767 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1985); cf Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,
463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983) (holding that captive audience theory does not apply to re-
cipients of objectionable mailings because they may " 'effectively avoid further bom-
bardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.'" (citation omitted).
' MTA Proposed Amendments, supra note 7, § 1(a)(ix).
128 Id. § 1(a)(xii).
129 See FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (citing protection of children in
holding that the FCC was justified in restricting offensive language on the radio).
12O Id. at 748.
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raphy." Advertisements hanging in display cases surely do not
rise to this level of pervasiveness. Furthermore, even if the
MTA's asserted interest in protecting minors was found to be a
compelling interest, the regulation is not "narrowly drawn" to
achieve that goal. The public's ability to view and consider a
given advertisement is subjected to what an MTA official thinks
is "disturbing" or is "sexually suggestive."" A regulation that
censors advertisements before they are displayed simply cannot
be the alternative that is the least restrictive of expression.
B. The Non-Public Forum Analysis
If a court determines that MTA advertising spaces are non-
public fora, the MTA's burden is to show that the restrictions on
expression are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum and are not viewpoint-based. 3 ' It is submitted that all of
the MTA's asserted interests in prohibiting these advertisements
are "reasonable in light of the purpose served" by the advertising
spaces throughout the transit system. The question is whether
the advertising standards on their face are viewpoint biased.
Perhaps due in part to the "murkiness" of the public forum doc-
trine, it seems to be a growing trend for courts to refrain from
ruling as to whether a forum is a limited public forum or a non-
public forum. Instead, courts have broadened the definition of
"viewpoint-bias" by ruling that regardless of forum, the particu-
lar regulation at issue violates the First Amendment." 4
Regardless of the type of forum, governmental regulations of
speech must be viewpoint-neutral." 5 The MTA cannot target the
'3' See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (upholding a N.Y. criminal law
punishing dissemination of material depicting children engaging in sexual conduct
regardless of whether material was "obscene").
"' MTA Proposed Amendments, supra note 7, §§ 1(a)(xii), 1(a)(ix).
133 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806
(1985).
134 See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384
(1993) (avoiding issue of whether school newspaper was limited public forum and
ruling that, as applied, state action in excluding religious group's expression while
permitting non-secular group's expression on identical subject constituted viewpoint
discrimination); AIDS Action Comm. of Mass. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth.,
42 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1994) (declining to classify advertising spaces as limited or
non-public forum, and holding that transit authority policy allowing rejection of ads
that were " 'sexually explicit' or 'patently offensive' " was unconstitutional where
transit authority allowed sexually suggestive movie advertisement but rejected con-
dom advertisement).
'31 See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Glendening, 954 F. Supp. 1099,
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"particular views taken by speakers on a subject,"'36 so as " 'to
discourage one viewpoint and advance another.' ,117 A state actor
may not restrict speech based on "the specific motivating ideol-
ogy or the opinion or perspective of the speaker.""8 Courts are
motivated by the fear that viewpoint biased regulations allow
government officials to "effectively drive certain ideas or view-
points from the marketplace."39
The second standard prohibits advertisements that are
"directly adverse to the commercial or administrative interests of
the MTA or harmful to the morale of MTA employees."40 This is
an example of a standard that, on its face, is viewpoint biased.
The MTA will tolerate advertisements that commend their busi-
ness but refuse advertisements that are critical of it." Thus,
this standard can be challenged on its face regardless of the fo-
rum classification of the advertising space. For the most part,
however, courts find viewpoint discrimination in "as applied"
challenges to regulations and they usually are fact sensitive.
CONCLUSION
Because of substantial disagreement as to the nature of the
designated public forum, there is no clear answer as to whether
the MTA advertising standards can be held to be facially uncon-
stitutional. The Court has been extremely deferential to com-
1102 (D. Md. 1997) (holding unconstitutional a prohibition of the display of a Con-
federate license plate); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (invalidating a
bias motivated disorderly conduct statute); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781 (1989) (upholding guidelines requiring the use of a city provided sound system
and technicians for noise control as content neutral).
136 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819,
829 (1995) (holding that a university's refusal to authorize payment for a religious
organization's printing costs violated the First Amendment).
'3' United States v. Kokinka, 497 U.S. 720, 736 (1990) (quoting Monterey
County Democratic Cent. Comm. v. United States Postal Serv., 812 F.2d 1194, 1198-99).
138 Id.
'39 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (holding that New York's "Son of Sam" law was inconsistent
with the First Amendment).
140 MTA Proposed Standards, supra note 7, § 1(a)(x).
141 See Newman, supra note 4 (discussing suit brought in 1995 by Natural Re-
sources Defense Council against MTA when MTA refused to display advertisement
warning of diesel pollution caused by buses).
[Vol. 72:485
NEXT STOP CENSORSHIP
mercial enterprises that are operated by government actors
wishing to restrict speech along content-based lines. In spite of
Justice Scalia's recent proclamation that the government cannot
evade "the most solemn obligations imposed in the Constitution
by simply resorting to the corporate form, "1 the Court's recent
interpretation of the public forum doctrine has provided govern-
ment with the very avenue to escape those obligations. The MTA
advertising spaces are a limited public forum. The MTA histori-
cally has allowed political, non-commercial advertisements to be
displayed there. The spaces are designed for expressive pur-
poses. As government actors, the MTA must not be given the
unilateral authority to judge what expressive activity can and
cannot be displayed on its property. Such a regime leads to cen-
sorship.
Michael J. Garvey*
142 Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 397 (1995).
* To my parents for all of their support.
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